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Abstract – Research on technological aspects of information security risk is a well-established 
area and familiar territory for most information security professionals. The same cannot be said 
about the economic value of information security investments in organisations. While there is an 
emerging research base investigating suitable approaches measuring the value of investments in 
information security, it remains difficult for practitioners to identify key approaches in current 
research. To address this issue, we conducted a systematic literature review on approaches used 
to evaluate investments in information security. Following a defined review protocol, we 
searched several databases for relevant primary studies and extracted key details from the 
identified studies to answer our research questions. The contributions of this work include: a 
comparison framework and a catalogue of existing approaches and trends that would help 
researchers and practitioners navigate existing work; categorisation and mapping of approaches 
according to their key elements and components; and a summary of key challenges and benefits 
of existing work, which should help focus future research efforts. 
Keywords – Information Systems; Information Security; Econometrics; Return on Security 
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1 Introduction 
The security of information assets in organisations has been a research subject for many years 
(Badenhorst and Eloff, 1990, Loch et al., 1992, Blakley et al., 2001, Siponen and Oinas-
Kukkonen, 2007) largely focusing on technology and technological risks. While there has been 
early research on the economic impact of information security risks (Ekenberg et al., 1995), 
academic research was rather limited until the turn of the millennium when papers by Anderson 
(2001) as well as Gordon and Loeb (2002) raised interest in this topic. This effort is closely 
aligned with research in the fast moving area of information security risks in general, which 
represents a challenging problem on its own right (Hoo, 2000). The situation presents a dilemma 
as understanding the risks involved in an investment is a key requirement to assessing the 
expected benefits of the investment; as Hertz (1979) states “… the courage to act boldly in the 
face of apparent uncertainty can be greatly bolstered by the clarity of portrayal of the risks and 
possible rewards.” 
This led to a situation where security professionals tasked with the protection of information 
assets have to justify security investments with little access to widely adopted financial methods. 
This is due to the lack of a tangible return on investment since security measures aim to reduce 
loss and not commonly generate revenue. The result is a battle on various fronts. It involves the 
challenge of understanding what the current and future threats to the organisations’ information 
assets are; prioritising those with the highest probability to be realised on the highest valued 
assets; and investigating appropriate countermeasures. Not only this is a highly complex 
undertaking based on estimates and assumptions, it is merely the preamble to a budget approval 
process. The security professional is faced with the challenge of transforming the identified risks 
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into financial formulas to justify the investment in controls by showing value and priority (e.g. 
compared to other projects within the organisation competing for the same pot of money). 
1.1 Background 
Gordon and Loeb (2006) found limited evidence of the effectiveness of a cost-benefit approach 
in organisations but conclude “However, on the open-ended questions, a few respondents noted 
the budgeted expenditure level on information security for their firms is largely driven by such 
items as the past year’s budget, best practices in the industry, or a mustdo approach.” Along 
similar lines, Hoo (2000) argues that decisions favour security only when the security advocate 
commands significant respect from senior management. Likewise, Moore et al. (2015) found that 
in certain situations calculating return on investment (ROI) is feasible, even helpful, while in 
other cases it is not an appropriate measure. Wood and Parker (2004) went a step further and 
advise against using traditional financial analysis arguing that it is difficult and 
counterproductive to try to apply these in the context of information security. On the other hand, 
investment decisions in security based on anecdotal evidence tend to backfire as security 
measures have a tendency to look like redundant outlay, whether they work (the lack of loss 
events impacts value perception of the protective measure) or not (loss occurs despite the 
investment). This is clearly not an ideal situation for a rapidly maturing Information Security 
profession. It may even raise questions about the ability of the Chief Information Security 
Officer (CISO) properly doing the job or, in worst case, calls for an audit to verify whether 
security budgets may be misappropriated (Gordon et al., 2008). Even in absence of malice or 
incompetence is budget allocation a cause of tension; Srinidhi et al. (2015) find that managers 
over-invest in specific security-enhancing assets to reduce security breaches during their tenure 
as it is in their best interest. Herath and Herath (2014) discuss this classical agency issue in more 
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detail and provide guidance allowing firms to decide whether it is worthwhile to conduct an IT 
security audit. 
An ever increasing amount of research activity in the information security field at large makes it 
difficult to identify relevant research addressing the value challenge. Although various works 
have provided preliminary views on the topic (Kesswani and Kumar, 2015, Neubauer and Hartl, 
2009, European Network and Information Security Agency, 2012, Eisenga et al., 2012), with 
some providing some detailed analysis (Demetz and Bachlechner, 2013, Huang and Behara, 
2013), they tend to fall short of providing a comprehensive view of the literature, using a rigour 
approach.  
In this work, we conduct a systematic literature review to identify and analyse the state-of-the-
art. The paper will: provide guidance to practitioners looking to understand the current state of 
research; provide researchers in the field with an overview of the directions previous work has 
taken; and provide newcomers to this area with a good understanding of the state-of-the-art in 
economic assessment of information security investments in organisations. 
The rest of the document is structured as follows. In section 2 the research methodology is 
discussed. This includes the study’s research questions, search protocol as well as inclusion and 
exclusion criteria. Section 3 provides the data extraction and synthesis process of the primary 
studies identifying trends and developments in the field. Based on the data collected, the research 
questions are then addressed in detail in the remainder of section 3. Section 4 looks at the wider 
perspective of our work, section 5 discusses possible study limitations and threats to validity. 
Lastly, section 6 rounds off the paper with summary and conclusions.  
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2 Systematic Literature Review research method 
Pursuing the objectives of this study, a Systematic Literature Review (SLR) approach was 
adopted. Systematic Literature Reviews provide a structured method for critically examining, 
interpreting and evaluating the entirety of current research evidence in a certain field or area 
leveraging a strict framework and predefined questions. For this paper, we follow guidance 
provided by Kitchenham and Charters (2007), Brereton et al. (2007), Biolchini et al. (2005) as 
well as Cronin et al. (2008) and note challenges and limitations as explained in section 5. A 
multiple step approach that resembles the phases described by Kitchenham and Charters (2007, 
p. 6) was followed to conduct the review. To aid the process, a high level flowchart was created 
during the protocol definition phase (Figure 1). 
 
Define	research	
questions
Define	initial	search	
terms/logic
Test	run	search	with	
representative	
source	database
Review	results	for	
relevance
Modify	search	
terms/logic	to	
improve	results
Review	references	in	
sample	of	search	
results
Refine	search	terms	
to	extend	results	to	
relevant	material	as	
found	in	references
Identify	relevant	
source	databases	
(based	on	previous	
search	and	expert	
opinion)
Apply	search	terms/
logic	to	identified	
source	databases
Modify	search	logic	
to	accommodate	
source	db	
requirements
Review	results	for	
relevance
Export	&	
deduplicate	
identified	material	
from	all	sources
Remove	obviously	
unrelated	papers	
Define	inclusion	&	
exclusion	criteria.
Reduce	selection	
based	on	criteria.	
(but	keep	list	of	full	
results)
Consider	and	define	
quality	&	bias	
criteria	if	applicable	
to	SLR	topic
Milestone:	Protocol
Finalization
Define	final	data	
extraction	form	
contents
Draft	data	extraction	
form	based	on	initial	
studies	identified
Extract	data	from	
identified	papers/
study
Milestone:	Protocol
finalization
Define	data	
synthesis	approach	
(Quant/Qual)
Format	data	to	
structured	layout	
(e.g.	table	format)
Visualize	essence	of	
synthesized	results	if	
possible	(e.g.	graph)
Apply	synthesized	
data	to	research	
questions
Provide	
conclusions	of	
the	SLR	in	
structured	
report
Supplement	with	
relevant	manually	
identified	material
Synthesize	data
 
Figure 1 - Systematic Literature Review workflow 
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2.1 Research questions 
As shown in Figure 1, the SLR process starts with the definition of the research questions the 
study aims to answer. For this study, the following research questions were identified:  
RQ 1 What approaches are described in the literature to support decision 
processes for information security investments (in organisations) taking 
economic factors into consideration? 
The intention is to understand which approaches are proposed to value 
information security investments inside organisations. 
RQ 2 Are there any common key elements across the identified approaches? 
The intention is to understand whether there are any common elements or 
factors covered by the different identified approaches. 
RQ 3 What are the main issues faced by these approaches as reported in the 
literature? 
The assumption is that no approach is perfect, hence, under this question we try 
to capture issues and limitations as reported by the authors. 
RQ 4 Who is publishing on this topic? 
The intention is to understand the size and distribution of the research 
community. 
RQ 5 Is there any tendency towards the use of a specific approach? 
The aim is to find out whether there are any favoured approaches when it 
comes to economically valuing information security investments in 
organisations. 
Table 1- Review questions 
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2.2 Search construction 
To capture relevant material, the search has been constructed with inspiration by Beecham et al. 
(2006) as well as further modifications to accommodate the requirements of this particular 
systematic literature review. The selection of keywords was based on a review of key relevant 
papers in the field and the authors’ experience. Over the course of the protocol development 
phase, these keywords were refined based on preliminary search results. Test searches conducted 
led to the identification of more potential keywords (e.g. Return on Investment, ROI, Net Present 
Value, NPV…); However, these were not used to avoid potential bias based on too narrow 
search terms in an already sparsely researched field. Additionally, the preliminary search results 
with these keywords did not noticeably improve or return additional relevant material. The 
search has been constructed based on the keywords shown in Table 2. 
 
Keyword list 
Information Security, IT Security, InfoSec, investment, investing, economy, cost, benefit, 
finance, spending, analysis, analyse, analyze, framework, model, decision, justification 
Table 2 - Keyword list 
The keywords were relationally grouped and each group linked using Boolean logic. Clustering 
of terms in groups was done to allow for reduction of search strings as groups form relevant 
compound nouns (e.g. InfoSec investment framework). Search terms were shortened by use of 
wildcard (asterisk) where possible and sensible. For example - use of asterisk search with 
‘invest*’ did not just return ‘investment’ and ‘investing’ but also ‘investigation’ and 
‘investigating’ which is commonly used in relation to Computer Science but less useful in this 
context. 
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Group 1 “Information Security” OR “IT Security” OR InfoSec 
Group 2 Investment OR investing OR econom* OR (cost AND benefit) OR 
finance* OR spend* 
Group 3 Analy* OR framework OR model OR decision OR justification 
Table 3 - Search groups 
The search construct was tailored to suit each of the source databases following the specific 
search requirements / syntax of the database provider as described in Table 5. 
 
2.3 Search scope 
The search mainly utilised electronic databases to identify relevant literature. Source databases 
were considered based on their relevance to the field of computer science and information 
security. To return results from the databases mentioned in Table 4, the search function provided 
by each website was used. 
Source Description 
EBSCOhost http://www.ebscohost.com  
Web of Knowledge http://apps.webofknowledge.com/  
ScienceDirect http://www.sciencedirect.com  
IEEE_Xplore http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/Xplore/  
Table 4 - Source databases 
 
2.4 Inclusion and Exclusion criteria 
The initial results obtained through the search process were further filtered based on the 
inclusion and exclusion criteria below. 
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Inclusion: 
• IC1: Papers and studies investigating approaches and metrics supporting economic 
decision processes as it pertains to information security investments in 
organisations 
• IC2: Papers and studies are available in English or German language 
 
Exclusion: 
• EC1: Papers and studies investigating largely or exclusively non-economic 
approaches of information security (e.g. purely risk or technology based) 
• EC2: Short papers, articles or studies which do not provide sufficient new insights 
or ideas 
• EC3: Papers, articles or studies that are not peer reviewed (e.g. white papers) 
Where multiple papers were identified utilizing the same or very similar approach, the most 
representative paper (favouring the more detailed and more recent publications) was selected 
unless there were other major contributions reported in other papers to warrant inclusion (e.g. 
additional arguments supporting an approach). All search terms have been designed to capture 
papers and studies published in English; however, publications in German have been considered 
and included if returned as a search result or found as a relevant reference in a paper. 
The selection process entailed applying the inclusion and exclusion criteria to the title and 
abstract of the paper. Where this proved inconclusive, the paper was retrieved in full and 
reviewed. 
2.5 Search process implementation 
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Following the SLR framework as described in Figure 1, the search and extraction process was 
conducted as below: 
1. Define search terms and logic appropriate for the individual databases 
2. Review raw results and reduce by removing obviously unrelated material 
3. Export search results to reference management solution (Thomson Reuters Endnote) 
4. Create subfolders for each database searched and move imported references accordingly 
5. Remove duplicate papers based on author(s), year, title and reference type ignoring 
spacing and punctuation (Endnote functionality) 
6. Apply selection criteria and move selected papers in new subfolder 
7. Retrieve full paper for data extraction 
8. Review references in selected studies for further relevant material 
 
2.6 Search results 
The search for papers was conducted following the protocol defined earlier. Due to differences 
between databases, some modifications to the search string were necessary to optimise the search 
results. The search construct unique to each database is shown in Table 5. Some databases 
provided additional refinement options that were leveraged as described in the comments 
section. 
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Source Search details Comments # Date 
EBSCOhost ("information security" OR "IT Security" OR InfoSec) N90 
(investment OR investing OR econom* OR cost OR benefit OR 
spend*) AND (analysis OR analyse OR analyze OR model OR 
framework OR decision OR justification) 
(Business Source Complete, Communication & Mass Media 
Complete, Library, Information Science & Technology Abstracts 
with limiters applied - Scholarly (Peer Reviewed) Journals) 
143 2014-07-03 
Web of 
Knowledge 
(("information security" OR "IT Security" OR InfoSec) NEAR 
((investment OR investing OR econom* OR (cost NEAR benefit) 
OR spend*) NEAR (analysis OR analyse OR analyze OR model 
OR framework OR decision OR justification))) 
 
Refined by: Research Areas=( COMPUTER SCIENCE OR 
BUSINESS ECONOMICS OR INFORMATION SCIENCE 
LIBRARY SCIENCE OR OPERATIONS RESEARCH 
MANAGEMENT SCIENCE )  
Timespan=All Years.  
Search language=English, German 
Search scope was set to ‘Topic’ which includes Title, Abstract, 
Author Keywords and Keywords Plus® 
263 2014-07-04 
ScienceDirect ("information security" OR "IT Security" OR InfoSec) 
W/10((investment OR investing OR econom* OR cost OR benefit 
OR spend*) W/10(analysis OR analyse OR analyze OR model 
OR framework OR decision OR justification)) 
 
[Journals(Business, Management and Accounting,Computer 
Science,Economics, Econometrics and Finance)] 
281 2014-07-05 
IEEE_Xplore ("Abstract":(Security OR InfoSec) NEAR (investment OR 
economic OR cost OR benefit OR spend) AND (analysis OR 
analyse OR analyze OR model OR framework OR decision OR 
justification) ) 
Metadata 92 2014-07-06 
Table 5 - Search constructs and results 
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After removing obviously unrelated papers by conducting a one pass review of the raw search 
results as seen in Table 5 the count of papers was reduced from 779 results found by the search 
construct down to 270 papers of potential relevance. These were distributed across the databases 
as per Table 6. 
Source Initial paper selection 
EBSCOhost 105 
Web of Knowledge 139 
ScienceDirect 25 
IEEE_Xplore 1 
Table 6 - Overview of initial paper selection 
Please note that having one paper attributed to the IEEE_Xplore database in Table 6 does not 
necessarily mean that there were no other IEEE published papers on the topic but indicates that 
there was only one study that was not returned by the other sources. 
For the next step the results across all four databases were further consolidated and duplicate 
references manually checked and removed which reduced the reference count further to 261.  
The selection process of the papers to be considered for data extraction included a manual step 
exporting the initial selection to Microsoft Excel for easier handling. Each paper has been listed 
with a unique ID and reference information exported from EndNote. According to the defined 
inclusion criteria in section 2.4 a ‘single reviewer - two pass’ review was conducted to decide 
whether to include a paper in the review (Yes), exclude it (No) or review it in more detail 
(additional research required [ARR]) before making the decision. Further information was added 
to the fields ‘Duplicate’ (if the paper is a duplicate which was not identified as such by EndNote) 
and ‘Comment’ where required. The field ‘Included’ is defined as Boolean and either identifies 
the paper as included (Y) or not included (N) for the data extraction phase. After completion of 
this process, 22 papers were selected for data extraction. Examination of the references listed in 
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the selected papers resulted in an additional five papers identified to be relevant. Three of these 
were selected for data extraction bringing the total number of primary studies to 25. 
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3 Data extraction and synthesis 
The data extraction process was conducted on 25 papers as described in section 2.6. Table 7 lists all extracted details under various headers, as 
follows: 
• ‘ID’ represents a unique numeric identifier assigned to each primary study 
• ‘Reference’ provides the citation of the paper 
•  ‘Publication outlet’ provides information on the publication outlet where the primary study was published 
• ‘Approach’ provides a short description of the area of research as reported in the primary study  
• ‘Approach details’ provides a short description of the approach itself as highlighted in the primary study 
• ‘Key elements’ lists the key elements of the approach as reported in the primary study 
• ‘Reported benefits’ lists the approach advantages as reported in the primary study 
• ‘Reported challenges’ lists the approach challenges as reported in the primary study 
 
 
ID	 Reference	 Publication	outlet	 Approach	 Approach	details	 Key	elements	 Reported	benefits	 Reported	challenges	
13	 Arora	et	al.	
(2004)	
IT	Professional	 Risk-based	return	
on	investment	
RROI	measures	
how	effectively	
resources	are	used	
to	avoid	or	reduce	
risk	
• Net	bypass	rate	for	all	
security	solutions	
• Incident	risk,	residual	risk	
and	baseline	scenario	
• Easier	to	use	than	Net	
Present	Value	(NPV)	
• Appropriate	for	
identifying	amount	of	
investment	
• Not	appropriate	to	compare	
value	between	alternative	
solutions	
• Obtaining	true	cost	(observed	
damages)	
• Estimating	bypass	rates	
• Interaction	impact	between	
deployed	solutions	
• Representing	catastrophic	
losses	
23	 Bistarelli	et	al.	
(2007)	
Formal	Aspects	in	
Security	and	Trust	
Strategic	games	
on	defence	trees	
Game	theory	
strategies	based	on	
defence	trees	
enriched	with	
economic	indexes	
as	payoffs	(utility)	
• Return	on	Security	
Investment	(ROSI)	
• Return	on	Attack	(ROA)	
• Defence	trees	
• Identification	of	security	
countermeasure	
investment	level	up	to	
marginal	returns	
boundary	
• Lack	of	reliable	statistical	data	
to	use	in	a	quantitative	analysis	
• Ambiguity	around	calculation	
for	the	‘Risk	Mitigated’	
attribute	
28	 Bodin	et	al.	
(2005)	
Communications	
of	the	ACM	
Analytic	
Hierarchy	
Process	
Using	the	ratings	
method	variant	of	
the	AHP	to	
determine	optimal	
budget	allocation	
for	maintaining	
• AHP	criteria	tree	
• Fixed	budget	
• Supports	multi-criteria	
decision	problems	
involving	both	
quantitative	and	
qualitative	criteria	
• Does	not	consider	quantitative	
concerns	
• Strong	dependency	on	proper	
criteria	definition	and	weighting	
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and	enhancing	
security	
• Valuable	tool	for	
decision	making	and	
option	ranking	
31	 Bojanc	and	
Jerman-Blažič	
(2008)	
International	
Journal	of	
Information	
Management	
Combined	use	of	
multiple	indexes	
Calculating	
multiple	indexes	
for	each	
investment	option	
and	consolidate	
the	results	for	
decision	support.	
• Risk	metrics	
• Return	On	(Security)	
Investment	
• Net	Present	Value	
• Internal	Rate	of	Return	
• IRR	is	particularly	useful	
for	multi-year	
investments	
• NPV	describes	cash	
value	of	expected	
returns	
• Each	index	used	individually	
does	not	present	an	
appropriate	solution.	
• ROI/IRR	are	not	project	
magnitude	indicator	
• ROI	does	not	consider	the	time	
value	of	money	
41	 Cavusoglu	et	
al.	(2004).	
Communications	
of	the	ACM	
Game	tree	based	
on	solution	
quality	
parameters	
Game	theory	
strategies	based	on	
security	solution	
quality	parameters	
in	terms	of	risk	
mitigation	
• Damage	cost	estimate	
• Mitigation	quality	
parameters	
• Threat	parameter	
estimates	
• Understand	how	
parameters	affect	
optimal	
investment/cost	
• Assess	marginal	effect	
of	decrease	or	increase	
of	one	parameter	on	
total	cost.	
• Uncertainty	on	parameter	
estimates	used	for	the	model	
43	 Cavusoglu	et	
al.	(2008)	
Journal	of	
Management	
Information	
Systems	
Decision-
Theoretic	and	
Game-Theoretic		
Comparing	results	
of	sequential	and	
simultaneous	game	
theory	approaches	
and	decision	
theory	approach	
• Threat	parameter	
estimates	
• Vulnerability	parameter	
estimates	
• Sequential	games	
• Simultaneous	games	
• Strategy	decisions	
	
• Game	theoretic	
approach	achieves	
superior	result	over	
decision	theory	in	most	
cases	
• Uncertainty	on	parameter	
estimates	used	for	the	model,	
particularly	for	game	theoretic	
approach	
• Game	theoretic	approach	is	
assumed	to	be	more	complex	
• High	levels	of	uncertainty	
reduce	payoff’s	from	game	
theory	approach	
• Only	relevant	for	targeted	
attack	scenarios	
54	 Davis	(2005)	 Network	Security	 Practical	Return	
on	Security	
Investment	
Set	a	policy	
defining	the	use	of	
ROSI	and	adopt	a	
consistent	
approach	
calculating	it	
• Cost	of	controls	
• Cost	of	incidents	
• Financial	benefits	
• Definition/Policy	when	
to	use	ROSI	
• Clear	view	of	value	and	
benefits	of	security	
initiative	
• Making	information	
security	more	
accountable	and	
transparent	
• Quality	of	data	estimates	used	
for	the	model	
• Calculations	can	be	too	complex	
• ROSI	is	not	well	understood	in	
businesses	
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80	 Gordon	and	
Loeb	(2002)	
ACM	Transactions	
on	Information	
and	Systems	
Security	
Optimal	
investment	
amount	to	
protect	a	given	
set	of	
information.	
Leveraging	
information	sets	
with	security	
breach	probability	
functions	to	
calculate	optimal	
investments	in	
information	
security		
• Breach	loss	
• Threat	probability	
• Vulnerability	probability	
• Cost	of	control	
• Considers	how	
vulnerability	and	loss	
affect	optimal	security	
investment	
• Supports	decision	at	
what	vulnerability	level	
to	focus	investments	
• Provides	upper	limit	for	
optimal	investment	
• Not	intended	to	cover	
catastrophic	events/loss	
• Uncertainty	on	threat,	
vulnerability	and	loss	estimates	
• Principal/Agency	cost	not	
considered	
95	 Hausken	
(2006a)	
Journal	of	
Accounting	and	
Public	Policy	
Income,	
interdependence,	
and	substitution	
effects	affecting	
incentives	for	
security	
investment	
Optimal	strategies	
regarding	security	
investment	taking	
income	effect,	
interdependence	
and	substitution	
between	attacker	
and	defender	as	
well	as	among	
defenders	into	
consideration	
• Asset	value	
• Inefficiency	factor	
• Attackers	resources	
• Average	levels	of	attack	
• Multi	stage	games	
	
• Rate	of	return	from	
security	investment	
(Marginal	Rate	of	
substitution)	
• Appropriate	investment	
based	on	identified	
attacker	
• Appropriate	investment	
based	on	substitution	&	
interdependence	effect	
among	firms	
• Time	factors	not	considered	
• Assumptions	made	on	key	
parameters	
99	 Herath	and	
Herath	(2008)	
Journal	of	
Management	
Information	
Systems.	
Real	Options	
Analysis	with	
Bayesian	Post-
audit	
Real	options	model	
for	information	
security	
investments	using	
Bayesian	
inferences	for	
valuation	
and	post-auditing	
• Total	cost	
• Expected	benefits	
• Volatility	parameter	
• (Bayesian)	Revised	
parameter	estimates	
lead	to	reduction	of	
upward	bias	and	the	
incorporation	of	up-to-
date	information	
• Reduces	the	possibility	
of	a	biased	forecast	
• Shows	how	to	integrate	
security-specific	
features	properly	in	
valuation	
• Incorporates	available	
information	into	the	
decision-making	process	
in	a	systematic	manner.	
• Focused	decision	theoretic	
approaches/situations	
• Focuses	on	technical	
dependence,	not	market	
dependence	
• Difficult	to	obtaining	prior	
estimates	of	mean	and	
standard	deviation	sample	data	
107	 Iheagwara	et	
al.	(2004)	
Information	and	
Software	
Technology	
Cascading	Threat	
Multiplier	tied	
into	Return	on	
Security	
Investment	
Use	a	standard	risk	
analysis	framework	
and	extend	it	by	
introducing	the	
Cascading	Threat	
Multiplier	to	arrive	
at	accurate	ROI	
calculations	
• Asset	Value	
• Exposure	factor	
• Rate	of	occurrence	
• Underlying	exposed	
assets	
• Secondary	exposure	
factor	
• Assists	in	formulate	the	
analytical	framework	
for	asset	valuation	and	
risk	calculations	
• A	more	comprehensive	
valuation	methodology	
that	includes	intangible	
factors	into	AV	variable	
calculation	
• Cascading	threat	multiplier	is	
‘somewhat’	subjective	
17 
114	 Jingyue	and	
Xiaomeng	
(2007)	
2007	International	
Conference	on	
Software	
Engineering	
Advances	
Real	option	
theory	
Apply	the	real	
option	theory	to	
make	right	security	
investment	
decisions	
• Binomial	Options	Pricing	
Model	
• Underlying	volatility	
	
• Comprehends	
uncertainty	and	
responds	to	dynamics	of	
business	needs	
• When	and	how	to	
implement	in	order	to	
maximize	the	likelihood	
of	desirable	outcomes	
• Determines	the	most	
value-adding	strategy		
• Assumes	profit-maximizing	
decisions	
• Key	parameters	need	to	be	
estimated	or	simulated	based	
on	historical	data	
123	 Khansa	and	
Liginlal	(2009)	
European	Journal	
of	Operational	
Research	
Security	Process	
Innovation	
incorporating	
real	option	
theory	
Model	of	invest-to-
learn	and	switching	
options	generated	
upon	early	
investment	in	
flexible	SPI	
• Volatility	estimate	
• Intensity	of	malicious	
attacks	
• Switching	cost	
• Binominal	lattice	
• Value	definition	of	
switching	solutions	
decision	
• Invest-to-learn	option	
• Considers	switching	between	
only	two	solutions	
• Competitor	impact	not	included	
in	the	model	
	
165	 Purser	(2004)	 Computers	&	
Security	
Total	Return	on	
Investment	
Risk	mitigation	is	
included	as	factor	
in	the	Return	on	
Investment	
calculation	
• Revenue	
• Cost	saving	
• Value	of	change	in	risk	
• Includes	the	financial	
impact	of	the	change	in	
risk	
• Requires	strategic	approach	
and	careful	planning	
• Must	be	business	driven	
186	 Sheen	(2010)	 Proceedings	of	the	
9th	WSEAS	
International	
Conference	on	
Instrumentation	
Measurement	
Circuits	and	
Systems	(IMCAS	
2010).	
Instrumentation,	
Measurement,	
Circuits	and	
Systems	
Fuzzy	Economic	
Decision-models	
Net	Present	Value	
(NPV),	and	
discounted	Return	
on	Investment	
(dRoI)	models	
leveraging	fuzzy	
values	for	cost-	
benefit	analysis	
• Triangular	Fuzzy	
Numbers	
• Net	Present	Value	
• Discounted	Return	on	
Investment	
• Interest	rate	
• Inflation	rate	
• Operating	cost/revenue	
• Considers	‘Opportunity	
cost	of	capital’	
• Eliminates	the	need	for	
complicate	sensitivity	
analysis	studies	
associated	with	input	
parameter	variations	
• Takes	degree	of	
confidence	of	the	
decision-makers’	
opinions	into	
consideration	
• n/a	
191	 Shirtz	and	
Elovici	(2011)	
Information	
Management	&	
Computer	Security	
Decision-support	
methodology	for	
allocating	
information	
security	remedies	
based	on	the	
end-effect	
perspective	
Calculate	the	
optimal	subset	of	
remedies	for	a	
given	budget	and	
the	most	cost-
effective	subset	of	
remedies	that	
comply	with	the	
organization’s	
policy	
• List	of	end-effects	
• Potential	damage	
• Protection	level	for	each	
end-effect	
• Cost	and	performance	of	
remedies	
• Does	not	use	
probabilities	of	
undesired	information	
security	events	
• Comply	with	set	budget	
constraints	and	the	
desired	security	level	
for	each	end-effect	
• Only	mutually	exclusive	end-
effects	considered	
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213	 Tatsumi	and	
Goto	(2010)	
	
Economics	of	
Information	
Security	and	
Privacy	
Real	Option	
Theory	
Analytically	
modelling	
continuous	real	
options	applied	to	
information	
security	
• Volatility	estimate	
• Drift	factor	
• Total	expected	benefits	
• Intensity	threat	
	
• Guidance	on	investment	
timing	
• Difficulties	predicting	threat	
timing/occurrence	
• Difficult	to	formulate	attacker’s	
objective	function	
237	 Willemson	
(2010)	
Proceedings	of	the	
Fifth	International	
Conference	on	
Availability,	
Reliability,	and	
Security	(ARES	
2010)	
Extending	on	
Gordon	&	Loeb	
Extending	on	G&L	
by	restricting	the	
class	of	possible	
remaining	
vulnerability	
functions	and	
generalize	by	
stating	simple	
functional	
constraints	
• Gordon	and	Loeb	model	 • New	family	of	
remaining	vulnerability	
functions	satisfying	all	
conditions	
• Generalizing	all	the	
currently	known	
example	function	
families	
• n/a	
244	 Yong	Jick	et	al.	
(2011)	
Decision	Support	
Systems	
Financial	
economics	based	
value-at-Risk	
methods	and	
operational	risk	
modelling	
Profit	optimization	
model	for	
customer	
information	
security	
investments	based	
on	value-at-	
Risk	methods	and	
operational	risk	
modelling	from	
financial	
economics.	
• Value	at	risk	
• Profit	at	risk	
• Revenue	
• Total	costs	
• Loss	estimates	
• Decision-making	
process	using	
operational	
riskmanagement	and	
value-at-risk	methods	in	
financial	economics	
• Risk-return	trade-offs	
for	information	security	
enhancement	
investments.	
• Classes	of	risks	that	cannot	be	
estimated	(Black	Swan)	
• Considers	only	quantity	of	
added	services,	not	cost	
• Uncertainty	on	estimates	of	the	
frequency	and	magnitude	of	
future	losses	
252	 Zikai	and	
Haitao	(2008)	
2008	IEEE	
International	
Conference	on	
Networking,	
Sensing	and	
Control	(ICNSC	
'08)	
Flexible	optimal	
IS	investment	
strategy	
IS	risks	are	
transformed	into	
opportunity	cost	
then	a	multi-object	
optimization	model	
is	build	up	based	
on	opportunity	
cost	and	direct	IS	
investment.	
• Opportunity	cost	loss	of	
C,I,A	
• Direct	cost	
• Impact	factor	
• Helps	to	make	more	
confident	justifications	
for	security	spend	
• Data	loss	is	hard	to	estimate	
using	equations	
• How	to	combine	uncertainty	in	
this	model	
254	 Huang	and	
Behara	(2013)	
International	
Journal	of	
Production	
Economics	
IS	fixed	budget	
investment	
allocation	
Investment	model	
defending	against	
concurrent	
heterogeneous	
attacks	taking	
budget	constrains	
into	consideration	
• Breach	probability	based	
on	scale-free	networks	
concept	
• Potential	loss	of	class	
• Cross-over	coefficient	
	
• Considers	budget	
constrains	
• Incorporates	concurrent	
attacks	
• Adopt	concept	of	scale	
free	networks	
• Considers	cross	over	
effects	of	investments	
• Uncertainty	on	assumptions	for	
variables	&	functions	
• Attack	category	classification	
can	be	imperfect	
• Total	budget	consumption	
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257	 Capko	et	al.	
(2014)	
2014	37th	
International	
Convention	on	
Information	and	
Communication	
Technology,	
Electronics	and	
Microelectronics	
(MIPRO)	
Cash	flow	
analysis	&	
Internal	rate	of	
return	
Practical	
application	of	cash	
flow	analysis	for	
information	
security	solutions	
• Initial	investment	
• Opportunity	cost	of	
capital	
• EoL	value	&	depreciation	
method	
• Tax	considerations	
• Working	capital	
considerations	
• CFA	model	be	used	to	
calculate	NPV,	IRR	and	
RoC	
• Determining	input	parameters	
esp.	avoided	cost/damages	
• Cannot	be	used	to	analyse	
investment	in	multiple	solutions	
	
M1	 Cremonini	
(2005).	
n/a	 Return-On-Attack	
(ROA)	
Improve	ROI-based	
evaluations	by	
integrating	them	
with	index	Return-
On-Attack	(ROA),	
aimed	at	
measuring	the	
convenience	of	
attacks	
• Attackers	gain	
• Attackers	efficiency	(or	
EFF)	
• Cost	of	attack	
• Identify	solution	that	
mostly	discourage	
attackers	in	their	
intrusion	attempts	
• Able	to	consider	time	
factor	
• n/a	
M2	 Faisst	et	al.	
(2007)	
Zeitschrift	für	
Betriebswirtschaft	
Dynamic	security	
investment	
calculation	
Model	offering	
decision	support	
for	dynamic	
security	
investment	
calculations	based	
on	Net	Present	
Value	
considerations	
• Reduction	in	expected	
damages	
• Reduction	of	opportunity	
cost	
• Operating	cost	
• Interest	rates	
	
• Despite	uncertainty	of	
key	factors	a	statement	
on	investment	benefits	
can	be	arrived	at	
• Optimal	time	of	
investment	
• Takes	budget	and	equity	
capital	constraints	into	
consideration		
• Interdependency	between	
security	controls	and	assets	not	
considered	
• Difficult	to	estimate	frequency	
and	scale	of	malicious	events	
• Operational	budget/cost	not	
sufficiently	considered	
M4	 Matsuura	
(2009)	
Managing	
Information	Risk	
and	the	
Economics	of	
Security	
Extending	on	
Gordon	&	Loeb	
by	productivity	
spaces	
Optimal	security	
investment	
considering	
Gordon	Loeb	and	
productivity	spaces	
(vulnerability	and	
threat	reduction)	
• Gordon-Loeb	model	
components	
• Security	threat	
probability	function	
• Identify	security	
investment	based	on	
value	of	productivities	
	
• Failure	in	assessing	the	threat-
productivity	can	lead	to	wrong	
choice	
• Uncertainty	on	estimates	of	key	
variables	
Table 7 - Extracted data of selected papers 
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3.1 Result review question (1) 
In the items listed under ‘Key elements’ as shown in Table 7 are those which were 
considered to be the important elements the primary study is highlighting, relying on or 
proposing as novel, crucial or providing key contributions to the respective approach. Likewise 
the items listed under ‘Reported Benefits’ are those which the primary study is listing as benefits 
particular to the proposed approach. Following the data extraction process we aligned each 
approach described in the primary study in nine high level approach categories. We summarized 
both, elements and benefits, into a wider elements category and repeated the same with the 
reported challenges. The categories were then used as basis to answer the research questions as 
defined in Table 1. Figure 2 shows a simple relationship diagram. 
 
Figure 2 - Overview of extracted data and relations 
Analysing the data extracted, it was clear that there were a number of approaches discussed 
in current research. Although fewer primary studies were identified than initially expected, the 
breadth of approaches covered was noteworthy. An attempt was made to categorise each paper 
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according to its approach in top-level approach categories to be able to construct a simplified 
overview. After careful consideration nine top level approach categories were identified that 
accommodate the individual approaches described in the primary studies. These categories were 
assumed to strike a balance between being too constraining on the variety of approaches 
described in the primary studies and avoiding too many approach categories which would hinder 
a meaningful summarization. The nine approach categories are described in Table 8. 
Approach category Description with reference 
AHP The Analytic Hierarchy Process is a structured method to break down 
complex problems with the goal to aggregate sub problem solutions into 
a conclusion (Saaty, 1994). 
DSS Decision Support Systems present a structured method to understand 
and improve decision process and support the decision maker to make 
decisions more effectively. (Keen, 1980, Alavi and Henderson, 1981)  
Game Theory Game Theory describes the study of strategic decision making in 
situations of competition or conflict leveraging mathematical models. 
(Neumann and Morgenstern, 1964) 
NPV Net Present Value is a valuation formula that calculates the present 
value of future cash flows of an investment (Ross, 1995) 
ROA Return on Attack is an extension to Return on Investment where an 
attacker’s gain as well his cost (losses) are considered in the model. 
(Cremonini, 2005) 
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ROI Return on Investment is a valuation formula that evaluates the 
efficiency of an investment based on cost and expected benefit. (Phillips 
and Phillips, 2010)  
ROI, NPV Papers which utilise a balanced mix of Return on Investment and Net 
Present Value to provide guidance on economic information security 
decisions 
ROT Real Options Theory describes a quantitative means to evaluate the 
flexibility inherent in the decision-making process (Miller and Park, 
2002) 
UM Utility maximization describes a concept in which a subject attempts to 
derive the greatest possible value from an investment (Strotz, 1955) 
Table 8 - Category explanation 
In Table 9 an overview of the categorisation for each primary study is provided.  
ID Author(s) Year Approach Category 
13 Arora, A., Hall, D., Piato, C. A., Ramsey, D., Telang, R. 2004 ROI 
23 Bistarelli, S., Dall'Aglio, M., Peretti, P. 2007 Game Theory 
28 Bodin, L. D., Gordon, L. A., Loeb, M. P. 2005 AHP 
31 Bojanc, R., Jerman-Blažič, B. 2008 ROI, NPV 
41 Cavusoglu, H., Mishra, B., Raghunathan, S. 2004 Game Theory 
43 Cavusoglu, H., Raghunathan, S., Yue, W. T. 2008 Game Theory 
54 Davis, A. 2005 ROI 
80 Gordon, L. A., Loeb, M. P. 2002 UM 
95 Hausken, K. 2006 UM 
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99 Herath, H. S. B., Herath, T. C. 2008 ROT 
107 Iheagwara, C., Blyth, A., Kevin, T., Kinn, D. 2004 ROI 
114 Jingyue, L., Xiaomeng, S. 2007 ROT 
123 Khansa, L., Liginlal, D. 2009 ROT 
165 Purser, S.A. 2004 ROI 
186 Sheen, J.N. 2010 ROI, NPV 
191 Shirtz, D., Elovici, Y. 2011 DSS 
213 Tatsumi, K.-i., Goto, M. 2010 ROT 
237 Willemson, J. 2010 UM 
244 Yong Jick, L., Kauffman, R. J., Sougstad, R. 2011 DSS 
252 Zikai, W., Haitao, S. 2008 DSS 
254 Huang, C. Derrick, Behara, Ravi S 2013 UM 
257 Capko, Z., Aksentijevic, S., Tijan, E. 2014 NPV 
M1 Cremonini, M. 2005 ROA 
M2 Faisst, U., Prokein, O., Wegmann, N. 2007 NPV 
M4 Matsuura, K. 2009 UM 
Table 9 - Category mapping by paper 
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Figure 3 shows how the approaches discussed in the 25 primary studies are mapped to nine 
approach categories. 
  
Figure 3 – Primary studies by category 
Looking at the results we can conclude that the focus of unique approaches is on three main 
categories namely: Return on Investment (ROI); Real Options Theory (ROT); and Utility 
Maximization (UM). While solid representation of ROI and UM is no surprise the strong 
presence of ROT research was unexpected as we had considered this approach to be rather niche 
and more focused on financial market valuation rather than corporate investment decisions.  
We also note that the majority of primary studies approached the problem from an academic 
perspective with focus on fundamental theories like utility maximisation, game theory or real 
option theory. This could be due to the selection criteria of SLRs which tend to exclude grey or 
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non refereed literature (e.g. white papers, etc.). Yet, several papers discuss practical 
implementation and extensions of the primary approaches. Hausken (2006b) analyses different 
classes of information security breach functions in order to examine the robustness of the 
Gordon-Loeb model, which is recognised in this paper under the Utility Maximization approach. 
Gordon et al. (2015) extends the ROT approach by assessing the impact of information sharing at 
the example of a firm deciding on security investment timing. The authors find that sharing 
reduces a firm’s uncertainty concerning a cybersecurity investment and decreases the value of 
the deferment option associated with the investment. 
3.2 Result review question (2) 
Overall, 90 key elements were extracted from the primary studies with several elements 
mentioned across multiple studies. To better understand which elements are considered key to 
this research topic we attempted to collate the individual elements into topical element 
categories. Table 10 provides a description for element alignment in each category. 
Element category Description 
Benefit Elements which have direct beneficial attributes like cost reduction, 
revenue or are explicitly described as benefit in the primary study 
Cost Elements which are a direct or indirect cost like operating cost, 
opportunity cost, switching cost, etc. 
Function Elements which are constructs like decision trees, mitigation quality 
parameters, fuzzy numbers, etc. 
Impact Elements that describe impact in context of the approach, like potential 
damage or list of end effects 
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Resource Elements which are considered resources like fixed budgets, asset values 
or attacker resources 
Threat Elements which describe or measure threats in context of the approach, 
like threat probability, attackers efficiency or rate of occurrence 
Volatility Elements which are specifically described as volatility element in the 
primary study 
Vulnerability Elements which describe vulnerability in context of the approach, like 
exposure factor, vulnerability parameter estimates or bypass rate 
Table 10 - Element category details 
Table 11 goes into full detail on how the extracted elements for all papers are aligned with 
element categories. 
Element category Elements 
Benefit Cost saving (ROI), Expected benefits (ROT), Financial benefits (ROI), 
Interest rates (NPV, ROI), Reduction in expected damages (NPV), 
Reduction of opportunity cost (NPV), Revenue (DSS, ROI), Total 
expected benefits (ROT), Value of change in risk (ROI) 
Cost Cost and performance of remedies (DSS), Cost of attack (ROA), Cost of 
control (ROI, UM), Cost of incidents (ROI) , Damage cost estimate 
(GT), Direct cost (DSS), Inflation rate (ROI, NPV), Operating cost 
(NPV), Operating cost/revenue (NPV), Opportunity cost loss of C,I,A 
(DSS), Opportunity cost of capital (NPV), Potential loss of class (UM), 
residual risk (ROI), Switching cost (ROT), Total cost (DSS, ROT) 
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Function AHP criteria tree (AHP), Baseline scenario (ROI), Binomial Options 
Pricing Model (ROT), Binominal lattice (ROT), Cross-over coefficient 
(UM), Defense trees (GT), Definition/Policy when to use ROSI (ROI), 
depreciation method (NPV), Discounted Return on Investment 
(ROI/NPV), Drift factor (ROT), Inefficiency factor (GT), Internal Rate 
of Return (ROI/NPV), Mitigation quality parameters (GT), Multi stage 
games (GT), Net Present Value (ROI/NPV), Protection level for each 
end-effect (DSS), Return On (Security) Investment (ROI/NPV), Return 
on Attack (GT), Risk metrics (ROI/NPV), Security threat probability 
function (UM), Sequential games (GT), Simultaneous games (GT), 
Strategy decisions (GT), Tax considerations (NPV), Triangular Fuzzy 
Numbers (ROI/NPV), Working capital considerations (NPV) 
Impact Attackers gain (ROA), Breach loss (UM), Impact factor (DSS), List of 
end-effects (DSS), Loss estimates (DSS), Potential damage (DSS), 
Profit at risk (DSS), Value at risk (DSS) 
Resource Asset value (GT, ROI), Attackers resources (GT), EoL value (NPV), 
Fixed budget (AHP), Initial investment (NPV) 
Threat Attackers efficiency (ROA), Average levels of attack (GT), Breach 
probability based on scale-free networks concept (UM), incident risk 
(ROI), Intensity of malicious attacks (ROT), Intensity threat (ROT), 
Rate of occurrence (ROI), Threat parameter estimates (GT), Threat 
probability (UM) 
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Volatility Underlying volatility (ROT), Volatility estimate (ROT), Volatility 
parameter (ROT) 
Vulnerability Exposure factor (ROI), Net bypass rate for all security solutions (ROI), 
Secondary exposure factor (ROI), Underlying exposed assets (ROI), 
Vulnerability parameter estimates (GT), Vulnerability probability (UM) 
Table 11 - Overview of elements and their use across approaches 
Roughly a third of the elements are abstract constructs like decision trees, mitigation quality 
parameters, fuzzy numbers, etc. and have been included in the ‘Function’ element category 
representing the biggest section. Looking at the other categories, it shows that cost, benefit and 
threat are the main contributing factors as per our primary studies. This is not surprising as these 
are inherently linked to risk and value considerations in information security. Mapping these 
element categories to the reported approaches does reveal an even more interesting picture as 
Figure 4 shows. 
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Figure 4 - Elements to approach category mapping 
While any conclusion drawn here hinges on the chain of assumptions made up to this point 
(aligning primary studies with approach categories, extracting elements from the papers and 
aligning elements in element categories) the displayed breakdown intuitively makes sense. Both 
ROI and NPV show a strong reliance on benefit and cost factors whereas the ‘ROI/NPV’ and 
Game Theory have a high function element as they heavily focus on sub functions (ROI/NPV) 
and game strategies. Interestingly the Decision Support System (DSS) papers are driven by 
reasonably easily measurable factors cost and impact, which would appear to make a good 
candidate for real world implementation. We further note that ‘Impact’ has little mention as key 
element in primary studies other than in DSS and UM focused papers. The utility maximization 
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(UM) approach stands out due to its balanced distribution of elements which would speak for its 
usefulness to assess the true economic value of investments in this context but implicitly also 
carries all the complexities. 
 
3.3 Result review question (3) 
We noted 51 challenges reported by the authors in their papers. Similar to the key elements, 
challenges have been consolidated in (five) areas. Table 12 provides a description on how the 
reported challenges are mapped to challenge categories. 
Challenge categories Description 
Accurate estimates Challenges related to estimates of key parameters or inputs for 
the described method, like frequency of malicious events, loss 
magnitude or quality of estimates in general. 
Complex to apply Challenges related to the complexity of the method, like 
complex calculations, subjectivity, attacker function modelling, 
etc. 
Constraint not considered Challenges related to items specifically mentioned in the 
primary study as not being considered by the respective 
approach, like catastrophic loss or time factors. 
Limited scenarios Challenges related to limits in applicability as reported in the 
primary study, like limited to targeted attacks, unsuitable to 
compare more than two solutions, etc. 
Real benefit Challenges related to identification of real benefit of the 
approach 
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Table 12 - Challenge category details 
 
 
Figure 5- Challenges to categories mapping 
While each approach category has its own challenges we see in Figure 5 that ‘Accurate 
estimates’ and ‘Complexity to apply’ are key challenges across most approaches. When 
interpreting this data it is important to note that a higher count of primary studies for a given 
approach is likely to produce an increased count of challenges for that approach. This is quite 
possible the reason why e.g. AHP shows a very low amount of challenges whereas GT or ROI 
show a wide range of challenges. It is interesting to observe that ROI lists complexity as key 
challenge which could be interpreted in a way that this approach may not scale well; 
alternatively, it could be argued that it is one of the most researched approaches and thus better 
understood in terms of challenges. 
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3.4 Result review question (4) and (5) 
To understand whether research in this area is progressed by only a particular institution or 
region, or whether there is a wider research community, we looked at the authors of the primary 
studies. In addition, we obtained all authors and co-authors affiliations as well as their 
geographic location. As can be seen in Figure 6 there is a strong research base in the US 
(particularly out of Maryland and Texas) with notable contributions from Croatia, Italy, Norway, 
Japan, Germany and China. The strong presence of primary studies by US researchers is not a 
surprise as, according to the inclusion/exclusion requirements for this SLR, our results are biased 
by language. We cannot comment on whether there is a strong research community covering this 
topic publishing in languages other than English or German. It must also be noted that this data 
only answers the specific question set for our SLR, only considering primary studies fitting the 
strict criteria described in section 2.4. It does not consider supplemental or tangential papers 
published on this topic. 
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Figure 6 – Geographical distribution of primary studies 
Lastly, to answer RQ5 on whether there is a trend towards a certain approach; based on our 
assessment of primary studies we were unable to identify a clear research trend. While utility 
maximization leads in publications on this topic, it certainly does not dominate the domain. The 
lack of novel ROI focused publications after 2005 is something of interest as it provides an 
indicator of the decline in original contributions to this research approach. Publications on ROT 
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are mainly observed between 2007 and 2010 but we continue to see research activity in this area. 
Notably, Gordon et al. (2015) extend the ROT approach with the aspect of sharing cybersecurity 
related information among firms, thus addressing some of the reported challenges on this 
approach (such as difficulties predicting threat timing/occurrence and key parameters needing to 
be estimated or simulated based on historical data). 
 
Figure 7 - Primary studies by year of publication 
As the simple timeline of primary study by approach did not provide a very satisfactory answer 
to RQ5 we retrieved additional metadata in hope to arrive at a better indication of research 
trends. The intention was to understand the impact the primary studies and the approach they 
propose on other studies over time. We decided to look at citation count for each primary study 
based on data provided through Google Scholar due to its comprehensive citation coverage 
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(Meho and Yang, 2006). To support collection of citation data and calculation of metrics 
(cites_year) we utilized ‘Publish or Perish’ (Harzing, 2007).  
Somewhat expected the citation count (absolute and average) is higher for papers published 
earlier on, particularly for the seminal paper by Gordon and Loeb (2002) [ID 80]. We generally 
observe that research on game theory and utility maximization provides a constant stream of 
cited papers over the years with a noticeable spike in 2008. Primary studies on other approaches 
appear to have a limited reach based on citation count which may indicate opportunities for 
further research; or simply point to a lack of interest in these areas. Again, no clear trend is 
observed but publication frequency and citation metrics point towards an ongoing interest in 
game theoretic approaches as well as general utility maximization research.  
 
Figure 8 - Primary studies by publication year with average citations per year 
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4 The wider perspective 
One of the advantages of the SLR process is that it helps focus the search process and 
ensures that relevant literature is captured in an unbiased way and using a repeatable process. 
However, it also means that some relevant wider literature is missed for not meeting the 
inclusion/exclusion criteria. In this section, we complement the SLR results by capturing the 
wider perspective to provide a more comprehensive view of the topic. 
 Gordon et al. (2015) emphasises the importance for firms to understand the process by 
which they can derive the most efficient allocation of their cybersecurity-related resources. This 
is now an widely accepted challenge and research on options to understand and address this gap 
is well underway (Gordon et al., 2003, Hausken, 2007, Dengpan et al., 2011). Recent efforts in 
knowledge and information sharing, as it pertains to cyber security, try to improve the defenders 
position by enhancing the collective knowledge on tools, techniques and procedures (TTP) of 
threat actors. Despite the collective benefits of moving towards a complete information game 
from a defender’s perspective, firms are slow to adopt. Some antitrust concerns aside 
(Department of Justice, 2014), the main challenge to overcome is that of free-riding; quasi the 
tragedy of the cyber sharing commons. It is in the best interest of firms to consume, but not 
necessarily share, cyber intelligence to improve their security position. This potentially redirects 
attackers to other firms, and therefore, reduces the other firm’s contest success (Hausken, 2007). 
With little market incentive to move away from such practices, governments are starting to 
encourage organisations to do ‘the right thing’ by applying a Thaler and Sunstein (2003) 
libertarian paternalism approach as evidenced in the US Cybersecurity Information Sharing Act 
of 2015 (The White House, 2015, Cybersecurity Information Sharing Act of 2015, 2015).  
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The question remains as to what the working approaches and strategies are for information 
security investments. In their empirical study, Rowe and Gallaher (2006) introduce a conceptual 
approach to consider the trade-offs between various investment and implementation strategies. 
Their conclusion provides a macroeconomic view stating that policy makers and organizations 
would benefit from a robust analysis of the difference between the social and the private costs of 
cyber security. Although not an empirical study, the model proposed by Bojanc and Jerman-
Blazic (2012) provides an interesting approach for the evaluation of investments in security 
based on quantitative analysis of security risks. The authors evaluate the profitability of security 
measures based on ROI, NPV and IRR using the output to compare individual measures with 
each other. Gordon and Loeb (2006) describe their findings of an empirical study they conducted 
among S&P 500 firms. They conclude that there seems to be a movement towards using more 
economic analysis in evaluating information security activities. Based on the study, a particular 
interest in NPV can be seen, but they also note that budgeted expenditure level on information 
security is largely driven by such items as past year’s budget, best practices in the industry, or a 
must do approach. Wei et al. (2007) conducted an empirical analysis of information-security 
investments surveying Japanese enterprises in context of vulnerability levels related to computer 
virus incidents. Taking the number of security measures as a proxy variable of security 
investment, they confirm that the effects of information security investment contribute to the 
reduction of relevant vulnerability levels. 
An alternative approach to the issue would be to considering risk transfer options as 
provided by cyber insurance. Miaoui et al. (2015) propose to distribute investments between 
controls to protect against security attacks; insurance to transfer the residual risk of loss; and 
forensic readiness to maximise capability to collect digital evidence. The authors consider the 
38 
interdependence of the investment strategies of their model when computing the optimal total 
investment. Mukhopadhyay et al. (2013) propose a way to assist firms to decide on the utility of 
cyber-insurance products and to what extent they can use them. The authors discuss using 
Copula based Bayesian Belief Networks to assess and quantify cyber-risk as decision support for 
using cyber insurance products as risk management tool. This is related to previous work by 
Herath and Herath (2011) who describe a copula-based simulation for determining the annual net 
premiums for cyber-insurance policies adopting an empirical approach using Archimedean 
copulas. 
 
5 Study limitations and threats to validity 
This section discusses the limitations of the study and threats to validity. This study suffers from 
limitations inherent to SLR as described by Kitchenham and Charters (2007). This includes 
limitations on search comprehensiveness and material selection. Due to the volume of papers 
returned and analysed, there is always the possibility that the study might have missed a relevant 
paper (due to an error or oversight) at any of the different stages of the search process. However, 
given the way the research questions were designed, and the way the analysis is based on a set of 
papers, the impact of any such potential omissions on the study findings and conclusions should 
be limited. 
While the search terms were carefully crafted, search term definition is a potential limitation to 
the study as relevant papers might have been missed. This is particularly true for papers not 
published in English. To mitigate this weakness, forward and backward reference checking was 
conducted on key publications to identify any potentially missed studies. As is custom with 
SLRs, for papers to be considered as primary studies, they have to be published in a peer-
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reviewed outlet. This put further restrictions on the selection process as material published for 
example as white papers (which is common in industry) could not be selected. 
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6 Conclusion 
This systematic literature review aimed to answer questions related to economic information 
security decision-making processes. Following standard SLR processes we identified 25 highly 
relevant papers describing approaches supporting decision processes for information security 
investments taking economic factors into consideration. We aligned the reported approaches into 
nine categories and identified research in utility maximization, game theory and real options 
theory to be areas where novel ideas are prevalent. We extracted key elements for each primary 
study as mentioned by the authors and collated the individual elements into element categories. 
Based on this we analysed which elements authors consider most relevant for their approaches 
and found both ROI and NPV to show a strong reliance on ‘Benefit’ and ‘Cost’ elements 
whereas Game Theory has a high reliance on’ Function’ elements due to its focus game 
strategies. We further noted that the Decision Support System (DSS) studies are driven by 
readily measurable elements ‘Cost’ and ‘Impact’. Many of the primary studies discuss challenges 
pertaining to their approach which we also extracted and summarized; we noted ‘Accurate 
estimates’ and ‘Complexity to apply’ the approach as key challenges across most studies.  
Looking at the sources of research we observe that a considerable number of primary studies are 
accredited to researchers affiliated with US based institutions but also note considerable 
contributions from European regions. Representation of the APAC region is limited but this 
could be due to language restrictions applied (IC2) for this SLR.  
Lastly, we analysed the publication timeline for the selected primary studies and found no clear 
trend towards one particular information security investment valuation approach. We did 
observed a decline in ROI and ROT publications whereas UM publications are notably present 
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across the timeline. This is supported by our analysis of citation count where we see studies on 
UM and GT being visibly more influential than other approaches. 
Taking the findings of this systematic literature review into consideration a reasonable 
assumption can be made that challenges originating from uncertainty on estimates for key 
variables is a problem which requires prior solution. A perceived increase in research activity 
into externalities of information security and impact of information sharing seems to support this 
but would require a more in depth review for confirmation. 
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8 Appendix – Systematic Literature Review workflow 
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to	SLR	topic
Milestone:	Protocol
Finalization
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study
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9 Appendix – Key elements distribution 
Elements	
AH
P	
DS
S	
G
T	
NP
V	
RO
A	
RO
I	
ROI,NP
V	
RO
T	
U
M	
Tot
al	
Benefit	 		 1	 		 3	 		 4	 1	 2	 		 11	
Cost	saving	 	     1	 	   1	
Expected	benefits	 	       1	 	 1	
Financial	benefits	 	     1	 	   1	
Interest	rates	 	   1	 	  1	 	  2	
Reduction	in	expected	damages	 	   1	 	     1	
Reduction	of	opportunity	cost	 	   1	 	     1	
Revenue	 	 1	 	   1	 	   2	
Total	expected	benefits	 	       1	 	 1	
Value	of	change	in	risk	 	     1	 	   1	
Cost	 		 4	 1	 2	 1	 3	 2	 2	 2	 17	
Cost	and	performance	of	remedies	 	 1	 	       1	
Cost	of	attack	 	    1	 	    1	
Cost	of	control	 	        1	 1	
Cost	of	controls	 	     1	 	   1	
Cost	of	incidents	 	     1	 	   1	
Damage	cost	estimate	 	  1	 	      1	
Direct	cost	 	 1	 	       1	
Inflation	rate	 	      1	 	  1	
Operating	cost	 	   1	 	     1	
Operating	cost/revenue	 	      1	 	  1	
Opportunity	cost	loss	of	C,I,A	 	 1	 	       1	
Opportunity	cost	of	capital	 	   1	 	     1	
Potential	loss	of	class	 	        1	 1	
residual	risk	 	     1	 	   1	
Switching	cost	 	       1	 	 1	
Total	cost	 	 1	 	     1	 	 2	
Function	 1	 1	 9	 3	 		 2	 7	 3	 2	 28	
AHP	criteria	tree	 1	 	        1	
Baseline	scenario	 	     1	 	   1	
Binomial	Options	Pricing	Model	 	       1	 	 1	
Binominal	lattice	 	       1	 	 1	
Cross-over	coefficient	 	        1	 1	
Defense	trees	 	  1	 	      1	
Definition/Policy	when	to	use	ROSI	 	     1	 	   1	
depreciation	method	 	   1	 	     1	
Discounted	Return	on	Investment	 	      1	 	  1	
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Drift	factor	 	       1	 	 1	
Inefficiency	factor	 	  1	 	      1	
Internal	Rate	of	Return	 	      1	 	  1	
Mitigation	quality	parameters	 	  1	 	      1	
Multi	stage	games	 	  1	 	      1	
Net	Present	Value	 	      2	 	  2	
Protection	level	for	each	end-effect	 	 1	 	       1	
Return	On	(Security)	Investment	 	      1	 	  1	
Return	on	Attack	(ROA)	 	  1	 	      1	
Return	on	Security	Investment	(ROSI)	 	  1	 	      1	
Risk	metrics	 	      1	 	  1	
Security	threat	probability	function	 	        1	 1	
Sequential	games	 	  1	 	      1	
Simultaneous	games	 	  1	 	      1	
Strategy	decisions	 	  1	 	      1	
Tax	considerations	 	   1	 	     1	
Triangular	Fuzzy	Numbers	 	      1	 	  1	
Working	capital	considerations	 	   1	 	     1	
Impact	 		 6	 		 		 1	 		 		 		 1	 8	
Attackers	gain	 	    1	 	    1	
Breach	loss	 	        1	 1	
Impact	factor	 	 1	 	       1	
List	of	end-effects	 	 1	 	       1	
Loss	estimates	 	 1	 	       1	
Potential	damage	 	 1	 	       1	
Profit	at	risk	 	 1	 	       1	
Value	at	risk	 	 1	 	       1	
Resource	 1	 		 2	 2	 		 1	 		 		 		 6	
Asset	value	 	  1	 	  1	 	   2	
Attackers	resources	 	  1	 	      1	
EoL	value	 	   1	 	     1	
Fixed	budget	 1	 	        1	
Initial	investment	 	   1	 	     1	
Threat	 		 		 3	 		 1	 2	 		 2	 2	 10	
Attackers	efficiency	(or	EFF)	 	    1	 	    1	
Average	levels	of	attack	 	  1	 	      1	
Breach	probability	based	on	scale-free	
networks	concept	 	        1	 1	
incident	risk	 	     1	 	   1	
Intensity	of	malicious	attacks	 	       1	 	 1	
Intensity	threat	 	       1	 	 1	
Rate	of	occurrence	 	     1	 	   1	
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Threat	parameter	estimates	 	  2	 	      2	
Threat	probability	 	        1	 1	
Volatility	 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 4	 		 4	
Underlying	volatility	 	       1	 	 1	
Volatility	estimate	 	       2	 	 2	
Volatility	parameter	 	       1	 	 1	
Vulnerability	 		 		 1	 		 		 4	 		 		 1	 6	
Exposure	factor	 	     1	 	   1	
Net	bypass	rate	for	all	security	solutions	 	     1	 	   1	
Secondary	exposure	factor	 	     1	 	   1	
Underlying	exposed	assets	 	     1	 	   1	
Vulnerability	parameter	estimates	 	  1	 	      1	
Vulnerability	probability	 	        1	 1	
Grand	Total	 2	 12	
1
6	 10	 3	 16	 10	 13	 8	 90	
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Table 13 - Distribution of key elements across approaches 
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